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INTRODUCTION
On June 11, 2014, the European Commission initiated State aid
proceedings against three Member States in respect of advance tax
rulings granted in relation to the transfer pricing practices of certain
multinational groups (Ireland—Apple;1 Luxembourg—Fiat;2 and the
Netherlands—Starbucks).3 It adopted a fourth decision in the same
series on October 7, 2014 (Luxembourg—Amazon).4 On February 3,
*

Principal Legal Adviser, European Commission. The views expressed in this Essay are
the Author’s alone and should not be attributed to his employer. The Author would like to
underline his own gratitude and admiration for Pieter Jan Kuijper, who during his time in the
Commission’s Legal Service was a source of support and inspiration for younger colleagues.
1. Commission Notice, 2014 O.J. C 369/22.
2. Commission Notice, 2014 O.J. C 369/37.
3. Commission Notice, 2014 O.J. C 460/11.
4. Commission Notice, 2014 O.J. C 44/13.
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2015, the Commission issued a further opening decision concerning
tax rulings (Belgium—Excess profits).5
In a period of heightened sensitivity towards the manner in
which multinational groups arrange their affairs and a widespread
public perception that these groups do not pay their “fair share of
tax,” these decisions have attracted a certain amount of attention.
They may be seen in a broader context encompassing the Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) project currently under way in
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (the
“OECD”)6 and the Commission’s initiatives aimed at greater tax
transparency, including information on tax rulings.7 Thus the adoption
of the three decisions on June 11, 2014 was accompanied by
declarations from the members of the Commission responsible for
competition and for taxation regarding the need to ensure fair
application of tax rules in the interest of a level playing-field for
business.8 Other declarations have emphasised a link between
taxation and the location of economic activity.9
Although the public attention these decisions have received may
be something of a novelty, the decisions themselves do not represent a
new departure in State aid practice. On the contrary, they are simply a
further step in a long development of case law and decision-making
practice which began in the era of the European Coal and Steel
Community (“ECSC”) Treaty. If there was ever a new departure, it
took place in the late 1990s, when increased interest in the possible
5. Commission Press Release, IP/15/4080 (Feb. 3, 2015). This decision deals not with
transfer pricing issues but with a scheme under which companies taxable in Belgium which are
members of multinational groups are permitted to deduct from their taxable profits amounts
which exceed the profits that the company would have earned as a stand-alone entity and are
attributable to synergies or to the distribution of tasks within the corporate group. Since the
content of the last decision is not publicly available at time of writing it will not be discussed
in this Essay.
6. Including the global standard on exchange of information between tax authorities,
now incorporated in EU legislation. See Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014
amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in
the field of taxation, 2014 O.J. L 359/1.
7. See Commission of the European Communities, An Action Plan to strengthen the fight
against tax fraud and tax evasion, COM (2012) 722 Final (Dec. 12, 2012); Commission of the
European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU, as
regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, COM (2015)
135 Final (Mar. 18, 2015); Commission of the European Communities, Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on tax transparency to fight tax
evasion and avoidance, COM (2015) 136 Final (Mar. 18, 2015).
8. See Commission Press Release IP/14/663 (June 11, 2014).
9. See Commission Press Release IP/15/4610 (Mar. 18, 2015).
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distortive effect of tax measures in the internal market led the
Member States to agree to the Code of Conduct for Business
Taxation,10 and the Commission to issue its Notice on the application
of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation.11
In line with its commitment made at the time to apply the State aid
rules strictly in this field,12 the Commission examined a large number
of national tax measures, including many of those identified as
harmful by the Code of Conduct Group set up by the Member States.
Nor is this the first time the Commission has examined tax
rulings or transfer pricing from a State aid perspective. In 2003 it
issued a number of decisions concerning tax schemes on transfer
pricing involving individual rulings in favour of companies. One
example is a Belgian tax ruling scheme for the foreign sales
subsidiaries of US companies.13 The Commission considered that the
application of a flat rate margin of 8% to a restricted set of costs did
not represent a genuine assessment of the level of profit that an
independent company could be expected to earn from comparable
activities.
The recently opened proceedings thus have a long pedigree. In
the light of the attention they have provoked, it may be useful to
understand how the State aid rules are to be applied in the field of
taxation, and what their relevance may be in seeking to counter tax
evasion and avoidance. While the function of State aid control is not,
or at least not primarily, to ensure that tax is paid in the proper place,
it has a contribution to make where a tax avoidance scheme of an
undertaking depends in part on the cooperation of State authorities.
The purpose of this Essay is to place in context the four investigations
currently open in relation to tax rulings on transfer pricing and to
explore the manner in which proceedings of this kind may serve to
correct abuses in international taxation practice.

10. Council Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997
concerning taxation policy, O.J. 1998 C 2/1 [hereinafter Council Conclusions].
11. Commission Notice, 1998 O.J. C 384/3.
12. See Council Conclusions, supra note 10, at 5.
13. See Commission Decision No. 2004/77/EC (Belgium – Tax ruling system for United
States foreign sales corporations), 2004 O.J. L 23/14, ¶¶ 12-18, 47-48; see also Commission
Decision No. 2003/438/EC (Luxembourg – Finance companies), 2003 O.J. L 153/40, ¶ 42;
Commission Decision No. 2003/512/EC (Germany – control and coordination centres), 2003
O.J. L 177/17, ¶ 26; Commission Decision No. 2004/76/EC (France – Headquarters and
logistics centres), 2004 O.J. L 23/1, ¶¶ 7-9, 51-53.
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I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS—WHAT ARE THESE CASES
ABOUT?
The function of tax rulings on transfer pricing—also called
“advance pricing arrangements”—is to provide legal certainty to the
undertakings concerned on the tax treatment of transfers of goods and
services between companies which are members of the same
corporate group—or in some cases between establishments of a single
company in different countries.
In very broad terms the taxable profit of a company is its total
revenue—sales and other income—less the cost of obtaining that
income. Among the costs to be deducted are amounts paid for goods
and services purchased. Where a company buys goods or services
from an unrelated seller, or borrows money from a bank, there is little
scope for debate as to the reality of the expense. The same is true, on
the profit side, where goods or services are supplied to an unrelated
purchaser. But where transactions take place between companies
under common control, the price of transactions can be manipulated
in order to allow the group as a whole to lessen its tax burden, by
shifting revenue to low-tax countries, and over-stating costs in hightax countries. Tax authorities and legislators are naturally aware of
this risk, so tax legislation typically allows the authorities to correct
the tax declarations of companies by substituting prices which
correspond to those which would be charged under market conditions.
The principle is also included in Article 9(1) of the OECD Model Tax
Convention on Income and on Capital.14
It is not solely transactions with related companies that pose
problems of this kind. Essentially the same problem arises in the
relations between a company and its permanent establishment in
another country. The branch will normally be taxed in the State of
14. See OECD, Model Convention With Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, art.
9(1) [hereinafter OECD Model]. The Model Convention states:
Where a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in
the management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or
b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control
or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other
Contracting State, and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the
two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those
which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which
would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by
reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of
that enterprise and taxed accordingly.

2015]

TRANSFER PRICING RULES AND STATE AID

1021

establishment as if it were an independent business entity.15 The
branch may be required to maintain separate accounts in that State, in
which case the pricing of transfers between the branch and the head
office will be subject to scrutiny. If there are no separate accounts, a
method must be found to identify the profits of the company that are
attributable to its business activity in the country of the branch.
Again, the guiding principle is the arm’s-length concept, the need to
identify the level of profits that would be achieved under market
conditions.16
Depending on the types of transactions in question and the
degree to which the company under examination operates on the
market at all, the determination of prices equivalent to those which
would prevail on the market—arm’s-length prices—may be a difficult
exercise. The Transfer Pricing Guidelines17 drawn up by the OECD
recognize five methods, of which three are regarded as traditional
transaction methods and two are considered transactional profit
methods:
(1) Comparable uncontrolled price (“CUP”): the simplest and
most intuitively satisfactory method compares the price charged
between related companies with the price observed in
comparable transactions between unrelated companies.
(2) Resale price: here it is not the price but the gross margin that
is compared. Where a product is bought from a related company
and sold to an unrelated company, the arm’s-length price of the
transaction between the related companies is arrived by
subtracting from the resale price a margin corresponding to those
realised in comparable transactions involving unrelated
companies.
15. See id. at art. 7(2). Article 7(2) states:
For the purposes of this Article . . . the profits that are attributable in each
Contracting State to the permanent establishment referred to in paragraph 1 are the
profits it might be expected to make, in particular in its dealings with other parts of
the enterprise, if it were a separate and independent enterprise engaged in the same
or similar activities under the same or similar conditions, taking into account the
functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by the enterprise through the
permanent establishment and through the other parts of the enterprise.
16. Cf. OECD, 2010 REPORT ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF PROFITS TO PERMANENT
ESTABLISHMENTS (July 22, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/
45689524.pdf.
17. See OECD, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS (Aug. 18, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transferpricing/transfer-pricing-guidelines.htm. The transfer pricing guidelines were first published in
1995.
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(3) Cost plus: again, a method based on margins but in the
opposite direction. The arm’s-length price for an onward sale of
goods or services to a related company is arrived at by adding an
appropriate mark-up—reflecting the margin applied in
comparable transactions between unrelated companies—to the
costs incurred by the seller.
(4) Transactional net margin method (“TNMM”): rather than the
price of transactions, this method assesses the level of net profits.
It takes an appropriate base such as costs, turnover or fixed
investment and applies a profit ratio reflecting that observed in
comparable uncontrolled transactions.
(5) Transactional profit split: this method takes the combined
profits of two related undertakings and divides them according to
the resources used by the parties and their respective functions,
taking into account, where possible, external data such as the
division of profits in comparable joint ventures.

The OECD guidelines are naturally not binding, but they
represent the result of long discussion and a certain consensus on the
most appropriate ways of estimating an arm’s length price or level of
profit. They are thus a point of reference for national tax authorities in
applying the arm’s-length principle, and they are explicitly mentioned
in the legislation or administrative guidance of many Member
States.18 They have also been taken as a basis for the Commission’s
analysis in previous State aid cases.19 The guidelines do not, however,
limit the freedom of action of taxpayers, which are normally free to
propose a method which diverges from those recommended by the
OECD if they consider—and can persuade the tax authorities—that
their alternative method results in a robust approximation of an arm’slength price.
The methods set out in the guidelines are not a smorgasbord
from which businesses may pick according to their taste or
convenience. Different methods are considered appropriate for
18. See, e.g., Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010, c. 8, § 164 (U.K.);
Bulletin BOI-SJ-RES-20-10-20140218, Journal Officiel De La République Française [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], 18 February 2014 (Fr.); Decree IFZ/2013/184M, 14 November
2013 (Neth.). See generally Transfer Pricing Country Profiles, OECD (last updated June 6,
2013),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/
transferpricingcountryprofiles.htm.
19. In addition to the decisions cited in supra note 13, see, e.g., Commission Decision
No. 2003/757/EC (Belgium – Aid Scheme) 2003 O.J. L 282/25 (upheld in Belgium and Forum
187 v. Commission, Joined Cases C-182/03 & C-217/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-5479).
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different situations and there is at least an informal hierarchy between
them. The traditional transaction methods seek to ascertain a market
price for each transaction or set of transactions, and the CUP is
considered to provide the closest approximation of a market price.
The profit methods, by contrast, estimate the profit that an
independent company could be expected to make from a line of
business or a business relationship.
The guidelines form a significant part of the Commission’s
reasoning in the opening decisions under discussion. In summary, the
circumstances giving rise to those decisions are the following.
A. Ireland—Apple
Among tax planners, Ireland is well known as a base for the
technique called “double Irish,” which exploits mismatches in the tax
treatment of companies that are incorporated in Ireland but not
resident there for tax purposes. This case concerns the tax treatment in
Ireland itself of two companies (Apple Operations Europe, Apple
Sales International) incorporated in Ireland but not tax resident there
under Irish rules defining residence.
Apple Operations Europe manufactures personal computers. It
purchases components from related companies and sells the finished
product to a related company. It also provides certain services for
Apple group companies in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. In
1991 it obtained from the Irish revenue authorities a ruling fixing its
net profit at 65% of operating expenses up to an amount of US$60–70
million20 and 20% of operating costs above that figure. A revised
ruling issued in 2007 defined profits as a margin of 10–20% of
operating costs together with a return on intellectual property of under
10% of turnover.
Apple Sales International purchases Apple brand goods from
third-party manufacturers and sells them on to companies in the
Apple group and other customers. A 1991 tax ruling set its net profit
at 12.5% of branch operating costs. Under a revised ruling issued in
2007 its profits are deemed to be 8–18% of branch operating costs.
The Commission has expressed doubts. The 1991 rulings do not
appear to have been based on any comparability analysis, but instead
were the result of negotiation aimed at fixing a narrow range of
taxable profits in Ireland. The method applied is a form of TNMM,
20. The precise figures are confidential.
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but it is not clear why operating costs are used as the indicator rather
than a broader measure such as costs of goods sold, nor indeed why
costs are considered the appropriate indicator at all. The discrepancy
between the two margins accepted in the 1991 ruling for Apple
Operations Europe—65% versus 20%—is hard to explain as an
arm’s-length calculation, and these figures appear to have been
chosen for other reasons. The rulings include capital allowances fixed
at a level for which the basis is unexplained. The 1991 rulings
remained in force for an unusual length of time. The allocation of
profits to the Irish branch of Apple Sales International takes no
account of the increase in sales over the period following the 2007
ruling.
B. Luxembourg—FFT
The identification of the beneficiary as Fiat Financing and Trade
Ltd. is a deduction from the data available. Luxembourg offered
limited cooperation during the initial stages of the procedure and
refused to identify the company, citing secrecy concerns.
Fiat Financing and Trade (“FFT”) is a Fiat subsidiary with its
head office in Luxembourg and branches in London and Madrid. It
performs central treasury and financing functions for the Fiat Group’s
operations in Europe—outside Italy—and is the immediate parent
company of Fiat Financing North America (“FFNA”) and Fiat
Financing Canada (“FFC”).
In autumn 2012, it obtained from the Luxembourg authorities an
advance pricing arrangement valid for a period of three years based
on a transfer pricing analysis carried out by FFT’s tax advisers. That
analysis presented a TNMM calculation based on the application of a
fixed rate of return to a portion of the company’s equity, resulting in a
tax base (taxable income) of some EU€2.5 billion ± EU€10 million in
each of the years covered by the tax ruling. The rate of return was
based on a comparison with publicly available information on a
selection of companies operating independently in the financial
sector. That rate of return (6.05%) was applied to the portion of equity
supposed to correspond to the minimum capital required of financial
institutions by the Basel II criteria.21 The capital corresponding to the
21. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED
FRAMEWORK (June 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm.
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equity holdings in FFNA and FFC was left out of account, and the
remainder, designated “excess capital” was considered to be
remunerated at a rate corresponding to short-term interest rates
(0.8%).
In the opening decision the Commission identified a number of
points of concern. First, the procedure followed appeared to entail
considerable discretion for the tax authorities, in itself a potential
source of exceptional treatment. It was questionable whether the
retention of a fixed tax base for the duration of the tax ruling could be
thought to reflect arm’s-length conditions since it did not allow for
variations in performance. Methods other than TNMM seemed likely
to produce a more reliable result since external points of reference for
at least some of the financial activities carried on could be used in a
CUP analysis. The rate of return appeared excessively low, as did the
portion of equity capital taken as the base for the calculation.
C. Luxembourg—Amazon
Amazon has a number of subsidiaries in Luxembourg, most of
them members of a fiscal unit headed by Amazon EU Sàrl, a limited
company incorporated and resident there. These companies carry on
the retail and other business activities of the Amazon group in
Europe, notably through retail websites. In particular, Amazon EU
Sàrl owns the inventory and earns the profits arising from retail
sales.22 Amazon EU Sàrl is owned by Amazon Europe Technologies
Holding SCS, a Luxembourg limited partnership which also licenses
intellectual property to Amazon EU Sàrl. The limited partnership is
transparent for tax purposes; its income is taxable only in the hands of
the partners, three US companies which are neither resident in
Luxembourg nor have a permanent establishment there. It is thus not
liable for corporation tax or income tax in Luxembourg.
In November 2003, the Luxembourg tax authorities issued a
ruling agreeing to the tax treatment of Amazon EU Sàrl proposed by
its tax adviser. That ruling has been in force ever since. In essence it
fixes the return to Amazon EU Sàrl at the lesser of 4–6%23 of its total
operating expenses and the total EU operating profits of the Amazon
22. See Amazon’s evidence given to the House of Commons Public Accounts
Committee, Report on HMRC’s 2011-2012 Accounts, 2012-13, H.C. (U.K.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmpubacc/writev/716/m03.htm.
23. The precise figure is confidential.
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websites, subject to a floor and a ceiling of 0.45% and 0.55% of
Amazon’s net EU sales revenue. The amount in excess of that is
stated to be the royalty payable to Amazon Europe Technologies
Holding SCS for the use of its intellectual property—hence a
deductible expense.
The Commission’s decision of October 7, 2014 raises a number
of issues. There is no indication that Amazon’s request was
accompanied by a comparability report, and the request was granted
in an unusually short time—11 working days—casting doubt on the
assessment carried out. The calculation used does not appear to
correspond to any of the OECD-approved methods. The royalty is not
a function of output, sales, or profits, but is calculated as the residual
profit above a certain fixed level. The profit margin of between 4%
and 6% seems low, and the cap on profit represented by the figure of
0.55% of net turnover reinforces that perception. Finally, it is unusual
that a transfer price ruling should be valid for more than a few years
at a time without revision.
D. Netherlands—Starbucks
Two subsidiaries of the Starbucks group resident in the
Netherlands are responsible for a range of group activities in Europe,
the Middle East, and Africa. Both companies are beneficiaries of tax
rulings issued by the Netherlands authorities but only one of these
rulings is the object of the procedure.
Starbucks Manufacturing BV, a company resident in the
Netherlands, is responsible for roasting the coffee used in Starbucks
outlets in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. It buys the coffee
beans from a related company and pays another related entity—a UK
limited partnership—a royalty for the use of intellectual property. In
2008 it obtained a tax ruling from the Netherlands tax authorities
fixing its remuneration as a mark-up of 9–12%24 on a defined cost
base. The ruling applies the TNMM method on the basis of a report
submitted by Starbucks Manufacturing’s tax adviser. The
Commission’s doubts are the following: It is not clear that Starbucks
Manufacturing is properly to be regarded as a low-risk toll
manufacturer so as to justify the low margin applied; the cost base
appears to be defined too narrowly since certain items of cost are
excluded; and the calculation of the royalty is suspect since it is
24. The precise figure is confidential.
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calculated as a residual profit without regard to any of the normal
bases of calculation of royalties at arm’s-length.
II. THE PROCEDURE—WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF THESE
DECISIONS?
The four decisions under discussion represent the second phase
in the State aid procedure, the opening of the formal investigation.25
The Commission may at any time, following a complaint or on its
own initiative, examine possible unlawful aid—measures which
constitute aid but have not been notified to it in accordance with
Article 108(3) TFEU. After an initial examination it may decide that
the measure does not constitute aid or that it is compatible with the
internal market. If it has doubts, it must initiate proceedings—that is,
carry out a formal investigation. The decision opening the procedure
must include a preliminary assessment of the existence of aid and
indicate any doubts as to the compatibility of the aid with the internal
market. The Member State concerned and any interested parties—for
example, the beneficiaries of the measure and their competitors—are
invited to comment. The Commission may also request information
from other sources.26
Once it has heard the views of interested parties and obtained the
information it thinks necessary, the Commission will adopt a final
decision. That decision may find that the measure under examination
is not aid, is aid compatible with the internal market—possibly
subject to conditions, or is unlawful aid.27 In the case of unlawful aid,
the Commission must require the Member State to recover the aid
from the beneficiary, unless recovery would be contrary to general
principles of EU law or the prescription period of ten years has
elapsed.28 For that purpose it must either identify the amount of the
aid to be recovered or provide the Member State with the criteria

25. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 108(2), 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 92 [hereinafter TFEU]; see also Council Regulation No.
659/1999 on laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the
functioning of the European Union, 1999 O.J. L 83/1, art. 6 [hereinafter Procedural
Regulation].
26. See Procedural Regulation, supra note 25, arts. 4(2), 4(3), 4(4), 6(a), in conjunction
with id. art. 13(1).
27. Id. art. 7, again in conjunction with id. art. 13(1), .
28. Id. arts. 14, 15.
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necessary for the latter to calculate the amount of that aid.29 The
Member State is required to take all measures necessary for recovery
of the aid.30
III. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK—WHAT IS FISCAL STATE
AID?
Article 107(1) of the TFEU forbids “aid granted by a Member
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain
undertakings or the production of certain goods.”
It is well established that State aid has four elements: (1) there
must be an advantage; (2) that advantage must be selective; (3) it
must be provided from State resources; and (4) it must have an
impact—at least potential—on competition and on trade between
Member States. The crucial issue in fiscal State aid is material
selectivity, the demonstration that certain undertakings enjoy an
advantage that is not normally available.
State aid is the provision by the State of financial assistance to a
business entity. The most apparent form of financial assistance is
naturally a cash subsidy, but it can manifest itself in any form of
transfer. In particular it can consist in what is sometimes called tax
expenditure, waiving payment of a tax or other charge that would
normally be payable.
As the Court of Justice put it in one of its earliest judgments on
the subject:31
The concept of aid is . . . wider than that of a subsidy because it
embraces not only positive benefits, such as subsidies
themselves, but also interventions which, in various forms,
mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of
an undertaking and which, without, therefore, being subsidies in
the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and have
the same effect.

29. Spain v. Commission, Case C-480/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-8717, ¶ 25. See generally
Commission Notice, 2007 O.J. C 272/05 [hereinafter Effective Implementation of Commission
Decisions].
30. See, e.g., Mediaset SpA v. Ministero dello Sviluppo economico, Case C-69/13,
[2014] (Judgment delivered February 13, 2014), ¶ 23.
31. Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v. High Authority, Case C-30/59,
[1961] E.C.R. 1.
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Aspects of this statement continue to be recycled in fiscal aid cases
today.32 It is in essence a statement of common sense: there is no
difference between receiving a sum of money and being dispensed
from payment of a sum of money that would normally be payable.
The same idea is found in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures. There, the definition of a subsidy includes a
situation where “government revenue that is otherwise due is forgone
or not collected (e.g., fiscal incentives such as tax credits).”33
The critical element in those definitions is the word “normally”
in “normally payable” or “normally included in the budget.” It
highlights the difficulty of identifying fiscal aid, a more complicated
task than identifying a subsidy: first it is necessary to determine the
point of comparison.
The most straightforward way of doing that is to identify the
generally applicable rule in relation to the tax concerned. Any
deviation from that rule may then be considered—at least prima
facie—to be an alleviation of a financial burden that would otherwise
be borne by the taxpayer, and hence to be State aid. That is the
approach that has been taken by the Commission in the vast majority
of cases and has been confirmed by the Court of Justice.34 It has the
virtue of simplicity and clarity, and it is usually satisfactory for
systems of tax whose main purpose is revenue generation, such as
corporation tax or value added tax—although there are cases where it
breaks down: see Joined Cases C-106 and 107/09 Gibraltar,
discussed below.
An early example of this approach in the case law is Case 173/73
Italy v. Commission,35 which also lays down other essential principles
such as the idea that Article 107 is not concerned with the cause, or
the aim, or the type of measure, but with its effects.
32. See, e.g., Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH v. Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten, Case C143/99 [2001] E.C.R. I-8365, ¶ 38; Commission v. Gibraltar, Joined Cases C-106/09 & C107/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-11113, ¶ 71.
33. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS:
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 231 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 14., art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii).
34. See Commission Notice, 1998 O.J. C 384/3, ¶ 16 [hereinafter Direct Business
Taxation] (a draft notice on the notion of State aid is currently under discussion and may be
seen on the website of the Commission’s Directorate General for Competition); Italy v.
Commission, Case C-66/02, [2005] E.C.R. I-10901, ¶ 100; Forum 187, Joined Cases C-182/03
& C-217/03, [2003] E.C.R. I-6887, ¶¶ 119-20.
35. Italy v. Commission, Case 173/73, [1974] E.C.R. 709.
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13 The aim of Article 92 [now, 107] is to prevent trade between
Member States from being affected by benefits granted by the
public authorities which, in various forms, distort or threaten to
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods.
Accordingly, Article 92 does not distinguish between the
measures of State intervention concerned by reference to their
causes or aims but defines them in relation to their effects.
Consequently, the alleged fiscal nature or social aim of the
measure in issue cannot suffice to shield it from the application
of Article 92.36

This case concerned a scheme under which employers in the textiles
sector paid a reduced rate of social security contributions. Italy argued
that the scheme was appropriate for two reasons: first, the sector was
characterised by a high proportion of female labour—since workers
were not heads of household they were not eligible for family
allowances. Secondly, the industry was particularly open to foreign
competition, and contributions were lower in other Member States.
According to the Court of Justice, the first argument was irrelevant
and the second simply emphasised the fact that the scheme constituted
State aid.
That approach may not always be appropriate, since the function
of taxation is not solely revenue generation. Taxation is frequently
used as an instrument of behaviour modification or as a Pigouvian
tool, used to correct what is regarded as an instance of market
failure—for example, carbon taxation insofar as it attempts to deal
with environment-related externalities.
Where taxation has a regulatory function, a definition of
“normal” in terms of the tax measure itself is less satisfactory. It is
arguable that the very fact that some people are taxed under that
measure and others are not already incorporates preferential treatment
of certain businesses. Indeed, it could be said that as soon as tax is
used for anything other than revenue-gathering there is scope for a
State aid analysis, since any attempt to modify economic incentives
by means of taxation may imply State aid to some category of
economic operators. Taken to its logical extreme, that could lead to
extensive intervention of State aid control in the economic policy of
Member States, perhaps in circumstances where that policy is
36. Id. ¶ 13.
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essentially neutral in its effect. It is not clear just to what extent the
scope and purpose of the State aid provisions of the Treaty justify
such intervention. However, these issues do not arise in the present
discussion, which relates to possible divergence from the norm in the
application of a revenue-gathering tax.
Under the approach typically applied by the Commission and by
the Court of Justice, the identification of a derogation or a departure
from the normal scheme of taxation raises three issues: the existence
of an advantage, the selective character of that advantage, and
consistency with the nature and logic of the system. An advantage lies
in relief from a tax charge that is normally borne. Examples given in
the 1998 Commission Notice include a reduction in the tax base
(deductions, accelerated depreciation), a reduction in the amount of
tax (exemption or credit), or special payment modalities (deferment).
These examples show that the notion of an advantage is already a
relative concept, since it represents a departure from something that is
“normal.”37 There is thus considerable overlap with the notion of
selectivity.
This first issue is merely a gateway: there would be no debate if
there were no advantage. The core idea of a derogation is found in the
next issue, selectivity. According to the Court of Justice it is
necessary to assess whether, under a particular statutory scheme, a
State measure is such as to “favour certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods” in comparison with other undertakings
which, in the light of the objective of the system, are in a comparable
legal and factual situation. By contrast, measures which apply in the
same manner to all economic operators are in principle general
measures. The Commission Notice adds the rider that such measures
must not be de facto confined to certain firms. Member States remain
free to decide on their economic policy and to distribute the tax
burden as they see fit over different factors of production.
What that typically means in practice is a three-step process:
1. Determine the system of reference
2. Identify a measure or a rule which represents a departure from
that system, by giving more favorable treatment to some
undertakings than to others. That leads to a conclusion of prima
facie selectivity.

37. See, e.g., Commission v. Portugal, Case C-88/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-7115, ¶ 56.
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3. Then check whether this prima facie selectivity can be
justified by the logic of the tax system (its nature or general
scheme).

According to the Court, “the concept of State aid does not refer
to State measures which differentiate between undertakings and
which are, therefore, prima facie selective where that differentiation
arises from the nature or the overall structure of the system of which
they form part.”38 In that statement there is an echo of the Court’s
reasoning in its case law on the application of the Treaty freedoms in
the tax field, and that should be no surprise—in both contexts, what is
at issue is fundamentally a question of discrimination.
In relation to a general tax such as income tax or corporation tax,
the first step is to take the tax itself as the system of reference. A
derogation from the system is a difference in treatment which does
not correspond to a relevant difference between taxpayers, having
regard to the objective of the tax. Such a derogation amounts prima
facie to a selective advantage, but it is still necessary to determine
whether there is an explanation for the derogation in the logic of the
system.
One example might be a progressive income tax. The system of
reference is the income tax. The objective of this system of reference
is to tax income. Low income earners and high income earners are in
a comparable situation in the light of this objective. Therefore, the
progressive rates grant an advantage to low income earners. There is
prima facie selectivity. However, the Member State can show that this
selectivity is justified by a guiding principle of its tax system, namely
the principles of redistribution and taxation according to the ability to
pay.39
The concept of the nature or general scheme of the system is one
that does not appear in the Treaty. It serves to ensure that regard is
properly had to the internal logic of the tax system even where a
difference in treatment suggests at first sight a derogation.
Consistency with this internal logic demonstrates that a provision is
general in nature and aimed at ensuring true equality of treatment for
taxpayers, not providing a special favor for some. Thus the adaptation
of tax provisions to take into account the particular features of a
category of taxpayers such as financial institutions—for example,
38. Id. ¶ 52.
39. Cf. Territorio Histórico de Álava v. Commission, Joined Cases T-92/00 & T-103/00,
[2002] E.C.R. II-1385, ¶ 60.
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through recognition of reserve requirements—does not necessarily
represent a special measure in favour of that category.40
This concept has been created in the case-law and has not always
been used with the greatest clarity. In particular, it is not always clear
whether the Court has in mind the nature or general scheme of the tax
system as a whole, the particular tax in issue, the particular tax regime
in issue or indeed the nature or general scheme of any system,
whether fiscal or not.
One may ask what justification there is for the separate treatment
of these second and third stages. After all, they amount to answering
the discrimination question twice over. That is why it is not wholly
unjustifiable to suggest that there is no real distinction between the
two stages. First of all, however, there is some utility in distinguishing
between the fundamental objective of the tax system and other,
secondary considerations that have a role to play. Secondly, there is
an important procedural aspect. According to established case law,41
at the third stage it is for the Member State to demonstrate that the
apparent discrimination, the prima facie selectivity, in reality reflects
the logic of the tax system as a whole. In that respect the Court
distinguishes objectives which are extrinsic to the tax system from the
mechanisms which are inherent in the tax system and are necessary
for the achievement of its objectives.
One example of the application of this process may be seen in
Joined Cases T-92/00 and T-103/00 Territorio Histórico de Álava.42
That judgment concerned part of a complicated case which had tax
and non-tax aspects.43 One tax aspect was a tax credit for large
investments which entailed some discretion for the tax authorities.
The Province of Alava argued that this tax credit did not constitute aid
since it was a general measure applicable to all investments of an
amount in excess of 2.5 billion pesetas—roughly EU€15 million.
Moreover, it was consistent with the nature and scheme of the tax
system since it was based on objective criteria applicable to all
economic operators that fulfilled them.

40. Cf. Italy, [2005], E.C.R. I-10901, ¶ 101.
41. Portugal, [2006] E.C.R. I-7115, ¶ 81.
42. Territorio Histórico de Álava, [2002] E.C.R. II-1385; upheld by the Court of Justice,
Case C-186/02, [2004] ECR I-10653.
43. Commission Decision No. 2000/795/EC (Ramondín SA and Ramondín Cápsulas
SA), 2000 O.J. L 318/36.
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The Court of First Instance reiterated established case law to the
effect that a measure is selective when the administration has
discretion in the application of the measure and can therefore make
more or less arbitrary distinctions among candidates. The measure
was also de facto selective because of the minimum investment
requirement: the benefit was reserved for companies with deep
pockets. In response to the argument on the nature and scheme of the
tax system the Court considered that if anything, the measure was
contrary to the scheme of the tax system since it provided a benefit
only for those with most resources. The further argument raised by
the Province of Alava that the measure promoted the economic
development of the Basque Country was irrelevant to the issue of
selectivity since it referred to a matter extraneous to the tax system—
this argument would naturally be relevant to the question whether the
aid was compatible with the common market.
Two remarks should be made in relation to the first and second
steps in the process. First, in determining the reference system it may
not always be clear what is the rule and what is the exception. An
example of that dilemma may be seen in Case C-6/12 P.44 The
relevant national law allowed companies to carry forward losses to
subsequent tax periods. It also permitted the transfer of losses
between members of a corporate group. However, in order to prevent
what was regarded as undesirable “loss trafficking”—the purchase of
a loss-making company for the purpose of setting off its losses against
the profits of the purchaser—the legislature prohibited the further use
of losses following the sale of a company. That was then found to be
an excessive response because it prevented the subsequent use of
losses in many cases where there was no reason to suspect abuse—for
example, the start-up losses of a new company which was taken over
by a new investor. In order to correct that problem a new rule was
enacted in order to allow some cases through the net. However, the
new rule was not clearly formulated and left considerable discretion
to the tax authorities. Administrative guidance indicated that aspects
such as employment were to be taken into account.
In the P case the Court criticized the excessive discretion
enjoyed by the tax authorities and the reference to extrinsic
objectives. It accepted, however, that an authorization system
44. P, Case C-6/12, [2013], (delivered July 18, 2013); cf. Commission Decision No.
2011/527/EU (Sanierungsklausel), 2011 O.J. L 235/26.
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permitting tax carry-forward only in certain cases was permissible
where it was based on the application of objective criteria aimed at
preventing trade in losses—paragraph 26 of the judgment. More
generally it may be considered that in circumstances of this kind,
what is important is consistency. In a case such as P, there can be no
objection from the State aid perspective if it is shown that the rule
distinguishes between abusive and non-abusive conduct, between real
economic activity and loss-trafficking. The question, what is the rule
and what the exception is in reality of no importance. Such an issue is
best dealt with in an analysis of the nature and logic of the system;
that underlines the conceptual utility of this third step as a safeguard
against mechanical reasoning.
Secondly, the reference, as a point of comparison, to “companies
in the same situation” is a dangerous one, for the question is, same
situation in relation to what? In principle the comparison should be
made with companies which are in the same situation with regard to
the logic of the tax system, which means that this is just another way
of describing the three-stage process. However, it is all too easy,
through this ostensibly innocuous phrase, to introduce extraneous
criteria. For example, Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint
Graphos45 concerned a special corporation tax regime (exemption
from tax) for producers’ and workers’ cooperative associations. That
was clearly a departure from normal system, and the Court thus dealt
quickly with the first two steps in the reasoning (selective advantage).
It then addressed the criterion of comparability as a separate issue,
saying that cooperatives are different from other economic operators
because of the special principles under which they operate: they are
managed not in the interest of investors but in that of their members;
their shares are not listed and are not easily transferable; they carry on
business for the mutual benefit of members; and they typically have a
lower profit margin. The Court thus concluded in paragraph 61 of the
judgment that cooperatives were not in a comparable factual and legal
situation to that of commercial companies.
That does not seem a sound approach, for none of these elements
has any obvious relevance to the functioning of the corporation tax
system. As the Court went on to observe in paragraphs 69–70 of the
judgment, objectives of exemption which are extrinsic to the tax
45. Paint Graphos v. Franchetto, Joined Cases C-78/08 & C-80/08, [2011] E.C.R. I7611.
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system are irrelevant and thus cannot preclude the application of
Article 107. The real issue has to do with the nature and logic of the
tax system. A cooperative of the kind in question is a group of
persons who share infrastructure and facilities, working together but
in their own individual interests and sharing the proceeds. It is
entirely consistent with the corporation tax system to treat such an
entity—despite the fact that it has legal personality—as transparent
for tax purposes, in the same way as a partnership. Costs are shared,
revenue is shared, and the profit is taxed in the hands of the workers
or producers. And the Court appears to accept that view in paragraph
71 of the judgment.
More usually, as for example in Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien,46
the Court speaks in paragraph 41 of companies which “are
comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in
question.” That is not very precise language, and potentially
misleading. If the “measure in question” is taken literally to mean the
particular rule under examination, then nothing is State aid, for all
taxpayers which benefit from the measure are treated equally. The
point of comparison must in the first place be the objective of the
reference system—taxation of income; taxation of the use of energy,
and so on. Thus a better formulation is that used in judgments such as
Case C-522/13 Navantia,47 at paragraph 35: “in the light of the
objective attributed to the tax system of the Member State
concerned.”
These remarks reinforce the over-riding importance of the third
step, the nature and general scheme of the system, and show that in
reality there is no clear division between the various aspects of the
debate. The ultimate question is always: does this rule make sense in
terms of this tax or of the tax system as a whole? That in turn
underlines the need to identify the system to be taken into account.
Normally this will be the reference system, but it may at times be
necessary to have regard to a wider context. The notion of “the
scheme of taxation” may have to be defined quite broadly, as the
following example shows.

46. Adria-Wien Pipeline, [2001] E.C.R. I-8365, ¶ 41.
47. Navantia v. Concello de Ferrol, Case C-522/13, [2014], (Judgment delivered Oct. 9,
2014).
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Case C-308/01 GIL Insurance48 presented a curious situation.
The value-added tax legislation of the European Union should in
principle apply to all goods and services, but a certain number of
services, including insurance, are exempt from value-added tax
(“VAT”) because it was not possible, when the legislation was being
drafted, to find agreement on an appropriate way of calculating the
basis of assessment.49 That is understandable, for it is hard to say just
what the price of an insurance service is. It is surely not the amount of
the premium, because the largest part of that is a contribution to a
common fund set aside to cover risks, and does not represent payment
for a service.
Tax advisers in the United Kingdom exploited this exemption by
developing a tax avoidance scheme: companies selling large
consumer goods on instalment plans would offer extended guarantees
worded as insurance policies. Had these been expressed as normal
service contracts they would have been subject to VAT at the
standard rate of 17.5%; presented as insurance, they were subject to
the separate tax on insurance contracts at a much lower rate, 2.5%.
The United Kingdom sought to close the loophole by applying a
special high rate of insurance tax—by no coincidence 17.5%—to the
contracts in question. That measure was challenged on the ground that
it constituted State aid to other insurance companies—those paying
the normal rate. The Court dismissed that claim, holding that the
higher rate should be seen in a broad context encompassing not only
the insurance tax but also VAT, for which the insurance tax was a
substitute. The difference in taxation was thus justified by the nature
and general scheme of the system, the latter being understood in a
broad sense.
The three-step model breaks down however in the face of a
general tax scheme which is inherently discriminatory, and a striking
example of that is Joined Cases C-106/09 and C-107/09 Commission
v. Gibraltar. For many years Gibraltar had a normal profits-based
company tax under which the “offshore economy” enjoyed effective
exemption. That system was considered by the Commission to entail
State aid. Gibraltar proposed to introduce a new system which
48. GIL Insurance v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, Case C-308/01, [2004]
E.C.R. I-4777.
49. There are in fact two categories of exempt transactions: financial services and
insurance, exempted for the reason given, and certain other services which are exempted for
reasons of public interest.
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consisted in a combination of payroll tax and tax on occupation of
business property, with a cap of 15% of income and additional
payments for certain types of companies. In essence, it reverse
engineered its previous system so as to duplicate its effect in what
was ostensibly a single system with no special or exceptional regime.
In a 2005 decision50 the Commission considered that this “single
system” was in fact a combination of different and mutually
incompatible taxation schemes, so that it was impossible to identify a
reference system and then to discern a “special regime.” The scheme
as a whole incorporated differentiation between categories of
companies in such a way as to provide benefits for some of them, in
particular offshore companies. The effects of the scheme were clear:
the grant of effective tax exemption to certain categories of
companies, in particular those active in the offshore economy—socalled brass plate companies. Indeed, the result of the new system was
that there were various tax regimes. Off-shore companies were in
general subject only to the payroll tax and thus continued to be
exempt, with the exception of those active in the financial sector,
which became subject to tax in the amount of about 5%. Companies
which actually operated in Gibraltar were subject to tax with a
maximum of 15% of profits—so there was essentially a 15%
company tax. Companies referred to as utilities—what one might call
immobile cash cows—continued to be subject to tax at a rate of 35%
of their profits, the standard rate of company tax under the previous
system.
The Court of First Instance quashed the Commission’s decision
on the ground that it had failed to identify a tax regime which gave a
special advantage to a certain category of companies.51 The Court
applied the standard approach described above and noted that the
Commission had not demonstrated the existence of any departure
from a normally applicable set of tax rules. On appeal, the Court of
Justice52 held that the combination of a tax based on payroll—with a
threshold depending on profits—and a tax on the occupation of
business property was neutral in nature and thus not selective.
50. Commission Decision No. 2005/261/EC of 30 March 2004 (Gibraltar Corporation
Tax Reform), 2005 O.J. L 85/1.
51. See Gibraltar v. Commission, Joined Cases T-211/04 & T-215/04, [2008] E.C.R.
II-3745.
52. See Commission v. Gibraltar, Joined Cases C-106/09 & C-107/09, [2011] E.C.R. I11113.
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However, the Commission’s failure to obey the standard approach
was not necessarily a fatal error. Selectivity can be found in a
comparison of the tax burden on different undertakings, the reference
framework being the tax system as a whole. A strict requirement to
demonstrate a departure from a “normal” regime would leave a
loophole which could be exploited. The proposed Gibraltar system
would result in de facto discrimination between companies in a
comparable situation having regard to the objective of a general tax
system for all companies. While differences in the tax burden are not
in themselves sufficient to demonstrate selectivity, here the
exemption of offshore companies was not a random consequence of a
dispassionate regime but the desired outcome.
That conclusion is open to criticism insofar as it seems to be
based on the purpose rather than the effect of the scheme—although it
is well established that a finding of State aid depends not on the
objectives of a measure but on its effects.53 There is also a hint of the
circular in its definition of the basis of comparison. Opponents of the
standard approach who think that the analysis should always be based
on comparability of the situations of taxpayers no doubt welcomed
the Gibraltar judgment. The standard approach nevertheless has its
merits and should be retained unless a robust and reasonably
predictable alternative can be found. More general application of the
Court’s approach in Gibraltar would be problematic: it would require
careful determination of the basis of comparison and an assessment of
the legitimacy of differentiation. In other words, it would require
potentially far-reaching intrusion in the tax policy of Member States.
It seems preferable to accept that the Gibraltar judgment should be
confined to a limited range of situations where the standard approach
breaks down because it is deliberately subverted.
As a final point, it should be recalled that while this discussion
has focused on the existence of aid, that is not the end of the debate in
a State aid case. Not all aid is considered undesirable; there is “bad”
aid and “good” aid. The latter can be authorized under Article 107(2)
and (3) TFEU as compatible with the common market, after
examination by the Commission.

53. See, e.g., France Télécom v. Commission, Case C-81/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-12899, ¶
17.

1040 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:1017
IV. TAX RULINGS AS STATE AID—HOW SHOULD THEY BE
TREATED FROM THE STATE AID PERSPECTIVE?
In the light of the foregoing discussion it is clear that advance
pricing arrangements, like other measures that fix the obligations of
taxpayers, are capable of constituting State aid. The question is, in
what circumstances and under what conditions? It should be
emphasized first of all that the mere existence of an advance tax
ruling, of a system for granting tax rulings, or of legislation that
envisages tax rulings, is entirely neutral from a State aid perspective.
The function of a tax ruling is in principle to apply the general rules to
a particular case, but doing so in advance rather than after the fact and
for a more or less prolonged period rather than a single tax year. In
this respect there is no difference between a tax ruling given in
advance and an individual decision taken after the fact on the taxable
income of a taxpayer in a given year. What is important is whether the
ruling departs from the normal system of taxation. Only then can
there be State aid.
In order to determine whether a ruling entails aid, it is necessary
and sufficient to apply the principles set out above. In relation to
rulings on transfer pricing—advance pricing arrangements—the
identification of the reference system seems straightforward. It is
quite simply the taxation of independent companies. They are taxed
on their revenue less costs, both sides of the equation being fixed by
the market. For related companies the answer is no different: they are
taxed on revenue less costs, and on both sides the elements that are
not fixed by the market must be verified and where necessary
substituted by a price that corresponds to the price that would be
charged in a market transaction. That surrogate for market prices is an
arm’s-length price which must be arrived at by a uniform and
defendable method.
That method, or range of acceptable methods, may be laid down
in national legislation. In theory the choice of a method by a Member
State is open to State aid scrutiny. A method which was not directed
at determining an arm’s-length price or one whose systematic result
was a price which could not truly be regarded as an approximation of
a market price could amount to State aid in so far as it had the effect
of diminishing the amount of tax payable by companies forming part
on multi-national groups. The sole obstacle to such an analysis (in so
far as the method was treated as a tax scheme) would be the reasoning
deployed in the recent judgments of the General Court in Case T-
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219/10 Autogrill España v. Commission and Case T-399/11 Banco
Santander v. Commission,54 according to which the concept of
selectivity requires the identification of a category of undertakings
defined by sector or by the nature of their economic activity.55
Equally unacceptable, for obvious reasons, is a system under
which the assessment is a matter for the unfettered discretion of the
tax authorities. Such a system would offend against established case
law according to which State aid exists where the competent authority
has latitude to choose beneficiaries or the conditions under which an
advantage is granted.56 Decisions of the tax authorities must be based
on an assessment of objective criteria stemming from the logic of the
tax system.57 By contrast, a system which is based on generally
accepted methods such as the OECD Guidelines, or any alternative
method which is used to calculate an arm’s-length price, is not in
itself open to objection. Attention must then shift to individual rulings
applying a legitimate method.
Here matters become more difficult. From a theoretical
perspective it can be said that where the tax authorities apply a
transfer-pricing method in such a manner as to procure an undue
advantage to an undertaking—for example by using a restricted set of
costs in a cost-plus method, or using an inappropriate profit indicator
in the context of the TNMM—the result is State aid. The choice of
methods itself is not immune from scrutiny; for example, the use of
the profit-split method may be considered inappropriate in respect of
a company which performs simple transactions for which there is an
easily available external comparator. From a policy perspective,
however, review of individual decisions represents an intrusion into
the freedom of action and of assessment of national tax authorities,
and is not a step to be taken without strong grounds.
Indeed in sheer practical terms the task is hazardous, for it is
likely to be only in extreme cases that one can with confidence say
that a particular decision reflects a misapplication of the chosen
method or that it does not truly determine an arm’s-length price. The
54. Judgments of 7 November 2014, currently under appeal (cases C-20/15 and C-21/15
respectively). Since the Author is one of the Commission’s agents (counsel) in these cases they
will not be discussed here.
55. (T-219/10, ¶¶ 34-62; T-399/11, ¶¶ 38-66)
56. See France v. Commission, Case C-241/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-4551, ¶¶ 23-24.
57. See P, [2013] (delivered July 18, 2013), ¶ 26; see also Commission Notice, Direct
Business Taxation, footnote 34 supra, ¶¶ 21-22.
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application of the methods sanctified by the OECD Guidelines is not
an exact science and leaves wide scope for the exercise of considered
judgment by the tax administration. Even the CUP method, which is
generally considered to deliver the most accurate and defendable
approximation of market prices, can entail adjustments intended to
take into account aspects which distinguish intra-group transactions
from market transactions—a comparability analysis may take into
account for example the allocation of risk or the performance of
functions which do not form part of similar uncontrolled transactions.
Methods which entail reference to average values for comparable
uncontrolled margins leave scope for even greater uncertainty.
It will be difficult to judge what is State aid and what is a
justifiable approximation of an arm’s-length price—or in relation to
other types of tax ruling, a bona fide assessment method aimed at
simplification of an otherwise difficult calculation. The burden of
proof will always be on the Commission to show that the result
arrived at in a specific ruling does not represent the proper application
of objective criteria. It is necessary to bear in mind the function of the
State aid rules in this context, and the competence of the Commission
and the courts in ensuring observance of those rules: it is not for the
Commission to police the application of tax rules, nor to substitute its
own idea of a good system for that of a Member State. But what the
Commission can and must do is check that the transfer pricing
methods applied by a Member State do not create an automatic
advantage for one or more categories of companies, that accepted
methods are applied in a coherent way, and that methods which depart
from the norm—where national legislation permits taxpayers to
propose alternative methods—nevertheless arrive at a result which is
a good or at least defendable approximation of a market price.
The Commission decisions which prompted the present Essay
concern individual rulings by national tax authorities. In some
respects that facilitates the analysis by the Commission. The sole
element that is really in issue is the existence of an advantage in
comparison with other companies. Since each ruling concerns a single
company there is no need to linger long on the issue of selectivity,
and the issue of consistency with the nature and logic of the tax
system can hardly be thought to arise.

2015]

TRANSFER PRICING RULES AND STATE AID

1043

CONCLUSION
The decisions of the European Commission of June 11, 2014 and
October 7, 2014 to open the formal investigation procedure in relation
to certain advance pricing arrangements are an indication of its desire
to contribute, through the application of the State aid rules, to fair tax
competition and to the fight against tax base erosion. There is nothing
novel or unconventional in deployment of State aid control in the
manner adopted by the Commission in these decisions, irrespective of
the particular background. On the contrary, the decisions are firmly in
line with previous practice and follow well established principles in
the identification of fiscal State aid, notably in the determination of a
selective advantage.
It may nevertheless be questioned whether the State aid rules
truly provide an appropriate instrument for the control of phenomena
such as profit-shifting by multi-national corporate groups. The
problem is necessarily a cross-border one—the corporate group
derives a benefit from a combination of national tax structures and
measures—while State aid analysis looks at a measure of a single
State. State aid control cannot, by its nature, capture the exploitation
of mismatches between national rules. Moreover, in such a context it
may be impossible to demonstrate the renunciation of State resources
that would normally be acquired through taxation. For example, in the
celebrated double Irish manoeuvre, it is not easy to see where Ireland
has lost tax that should normally have been paid there. The very intent
of the structure is to escape taxation not in Ireland but in another
jurisdiction.
Closer examination of the circumstances lying behind some of
the decisions discussed here suggests that in a properly functioning
system—and one in which taxation corresponds to the location of
economic activity—a certain proportion of the revenue alleged to
have been forgone by the national authorities would in fact be taxed
elsewhere. That indicates that the underlying problem is one that State
aid control is not well fitted to resolve, and indeed such a task lies
outside its intended function.

